IAD - 115/66 21 November 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director, NPIC

FROM:

Chief, Imagery Analysis Division, CIA

SUBJECT:

JIIRG Briefing on Support Costing

be comprehensive, thorough and well-execut. It was with considerable sadness, however that personnel, some with o years experience at NPIC, were placed in a position of listening to two young DIA staffers indict NPIC management for past managerial failure in both departmental and national arenas and put forth a procedure which "will now provide NPIC with a significant tool for management of resources". The ignominy of this was exceeded only by the abject silence on the part of all but a few of the Center's management personnel following the briefing.

- 2. There are several points which should be noted for the record concerning this procedure which appear worthy of additional investigation prior to acceptance of this "new" management tool:
  - a. The principle assumption that present levels of support personnel strengths are sufficient unto present tasking. This is obviously false as anyone knows who glances at the NPIC backlog' presented in each NPIC monthly report. This same assumption was used previously in computing PI manpower requirements and these requirements are now a part of the Center's planning program.
  - b. The concept of basic report type, content, frequency and resulting time factors was developed primarily from examination of reports and their production in response to Ad Hoc requests (Direct Reporting). We do not feel this methodology is valid. The types and frequency of reporting envisioned, upon which the entire manpower allocation is derived, are not necessarily the

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expressed needs of the intelligence community. In fact the formats and graphics are not a reflection of community needs but in large part of production elements' desires. In raising this with the briefers, they stated that it was only the methodology, not the precise figures, which they were proposing as a tool for Center management. Our experience is, however, that everything proposed by JHRG including the numbers becomes a hard and fast reality for IAD production components.

- c. The National Tasking Plan as presented, will create an imbalance in the numbers of PIs required in each work category; NPIC relative to IAD. Wherein presently both elements engage in similar work, NPIC will under this plan engage primarily in missile projects (3rd Phase).
- 3. Finally, we find it hard to understand from our own overview how senior NPIC management can permit IAD management to be placed in a position, with no recourse, of accepting a departmental PI and Support T.O. devised by two junior DIA staffers neither of which has ever held a responsible management post. It is further difficult to understand why there is no insistence on costing DIAAP 9 for all to view rather than limiting all JHRG investigations to CIA facilities.

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